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ELITE CONFLICT IN THE POST-MAO CHINA** 
I. Introduction 
Meeting in the Sixth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central 
Committee (CC) during June 27-29, 1981, leaders of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) approved the long-awaited resignation of 
Hua Guofeng as Party Chairman and demoted him to a junior 
vice-chairman.' Meanwhile, the CC Plenum elected Hu Yaobang, 66, 
a close confidante of China's most powerful man, Deng Xiaoping, the 
new Party Chairman. Handpicked by Chairman Mao Zedong in his 
final months of life, Hua had officially led China since Mao's death in 
1976. Thus, Hua's replacement by a protege of Deng who twice fell 
victim to Mao and his radical associates during the 1966-76 period 
symbolizes the passing of Mao's era. As a matter of fact, the Party 
gathering also approved a 35,000-word document, entitled "Resolu-
tion on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party," which 
critically evaluated Mao's career and sharply criticized his perform-
ance over the last two decades of his life, thereby further demytholo-
gizing the late Chairman.2 
In addition, the Plenum also made other leadership changes 
which bolstered Deng's hand. Zhao Ziyang, 62, a pragmatist who 
replaced Hua as Premier in September 1980, was promoted to party 
vice-chairman. Deng himself became Chairman of the Party's 
Military Affairs Commission (MAC), China's highest military deci-
sion-making body. 
These changes are part of a master plan that Deng has been 
painstakingly implementing ever since his political comeback in the 
summer of 1977. Deng's central goal (or vision) is to modernize China 
by the year 2000. To put it succinctly, Deng's master plan has three 
major components. The first is to institute political reforms and 
fashion bold, more practical, and less ideological measures designed 
to speed up China's economic growth. The second is to eliminate or 
** This is an updated and substantially expanded version of an earlier article, 
"Chinese Politics: Deng's Turbulent Quest" in Problems of Communism, Jan.-Feb. 
1981, pp. 1-21. Portions of this study was also presented in a paper, with the same 
title, to the Tenth Sino-American Conference on Mainland China, June 16-18, 1981, 
sponsored by Institute of International Studies and Institute of East Asian Studies, 
University of California <Berkeley). In my research and writing of this and earlier 
studies, I have benefited much from the writings, comments and insights of H. Lyman 
Miller, Ting Wang, A. Doak Barnett and Harry Harding, and I wish to thank them. 
1. See Beijing Review, July 6, 1981, pp. 6-8 for the Plenum Communique. 
2. Ibid., pp. 17-26. 
(1) 
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neutralize officials opposed to his policies, and replace those he 
considers to be inept or too old. The third is to install a team of 
possible successors who are talented, pragmatic and in their "prime of 
life" to guide China's destiny after Deng, now 77 years old, is gone. 
To date, Deng has scored impressive gains on all of these three 
fronts, notwithstanding the fact that these gains have fallen short of 
his expectation. It should be also noted that all along Deng has been 
encountering strong resistance in the Party and that the opposition 
has at times compelled Deng to go slow or even to retreat. For 
instance, many major political and economic reforms championed by 
the Dengists have not been enacted or implemented. 
This essay intends to study the struggle over power and policy in 
China's post-Mao leadership. Specifically, it will analyze key issues of 
contention in the leadership, identify individuals and groups with 
diverse views and look at their conflict. It will also examine the 
changing make-up of the leadership at the center, in the provinces 
and within military ranks since 1977, and analyze the background 
and outlook of the reconstituted leadership. 
II. Deng's Political Resurrection 
When Premier Zhou Enlai passed away in early 1976 after a 
lengthy illness, Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping, who had served as 
de-facto Premier throughout 1975, was widely regarded as Zhou's 
likely successor. Instead, he became the target and victim of an 
anti-rightist campaign launched by the late Chairman and his 
radical followers. Deng was vehemently attacked for negating the 
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR), a radical crusade 
launched by Mao since 1966, implementing a "revisionist" line that 
sought to restore capitalism in China.3 On April 7, 1976, the CCP 
Politburo, at Mao's urging, ousted Deng from his leading party, 
government and military positions, ostensibly for instigating a 
massive riot in Beijing's Tienamen Square two days earlier. The 
Politburo also named Vice-Premier Hua Guofeng, a political figure 
then relatively unknown outside China, to succeed Zhou as Premier 
and appointed him First CCP Vice-Chairman - a position which 
enabled him to contend for Mao's mantle a few months later. 
3. For analysis of the 1975-76 anti-Deng campaign, which has had considerable 
bearing on political conflict and personal antagonisms in the leadership in recent 
years, see Parris H. Chang, "Mao's Last Stand?", Problems of Communism (Washing-
ton, D.C.), July-August 1976, pp. 1-17. 
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After April1976, according to sources inside China, Deng slipped 
out of Beijing and fled to Canton where he was sheltered by Xu 
Shiyou, commander of Canton Military Region. In south China Deng 
met secretly with CCP Vice-Chairman and Defense Minister Ye 
Jianying and provincial party and military leaders from Guangdong, 
Fujian and Sichuan to discuss contingency measures to counter the 
radicals.• Immediately after Mao's death on September 9, 1976, Deng 
is said to have returned to Beijing to seek more support from other 
provincial leaders attending Mao's memorial service. Although Deng 
did not have a direct role in the coup staged by Hua and Ye on 
October 6 that resulted in the overthrow of the radical leaders, he 
may have mobilized considerable support for that move beforehand. 
Those who carried out the coup apparently acted with the knowledge 
that there was support from many party and military leaders 
throughout China for such a step. 
As soon as the radicals were gone from the top leadership, Deng's 
rehabilitation became an issue of controversy within high party 
circles. In the wake of the radicals' downfall, he wrote a letter to the 
CCP Central Committee, headed by the new Chairman, Hua 
Guofeng, asking for a reversal of his case. But quite a few Politburo 
members who had voted for his dismissal earlier and feared that he 
would take his revenge against them tried to block his reinstatement. 
One of them, Wu De, mayor of Beijing, publicly called for a 
continuation of the campaign against Deng in accordance with 
Chairman Mao's previous behest.5 Wang Dongxing, Mao's former 
chief bodyguard, contended that the reversal of Mao's decision on 
Deng would tarnish the late Chairman's memory. 6 In these and other 
ways, Wu Wang, and their fellow Maoists- subsequently labeled the 
"whatever" faction because, seizing and building upon some remarks 
4. See a speech by Zhang Pinghua lDirector of the CCP Central Committee 
Propaganda Department\ to a national conference of officials in charge of propaganda 
and cultural affairs on July 23, 1978, published in Chungkuo Ta-lu (Taipei\, No. 1:35, 
Nov. 15, 1978, pp. 55. (The text has not appeared in the mainland media\. 
5. Wu De made public speeches on October 24 and November 30, 1976, calling for 
a continuation of the anti-Deng campaign. See Peking Review, Oct. 29, 1976, p. 13, and 
Dec. 10, 1976, p. 11. It was also Wu who, on Apr. 5, 1976, had addressed the crowds at 
Tienamen Square and had characterized the demonstration as a "counterrevolution-
ary" event. 
6. Hu Jiwei (editor of Renmin Ribaol, "The Struggle at the Higher Circles of the 
Party," Chengming (Hong Kong\, No. 34, August 1980, p. 51. This is a portion of a 
classified speech that Hu made to the Central Party School on Sept. 13, 1979. None of 
the speech has been published in the media inside China. See also Lo Ping, "The 
Political Eclipse of the 'Whatever Faction'," ibid., No. 16, 1979, pp. 5-8. 
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of Hua, they coined the statement that "whatever policy Chairman 
Mao has decided upon, we shall resolutely defend; whatever instruc-
tions the Chairman has issued, and propagated it in the media, we 
shall steadfastly obey"- attempted to invoke Mao's sacred authority 
to prevent the rehabilitation of Deng and other GPCR victims.i 
Confronted by this division within the Politburo, Hua wavered and 
dragged his feet on Deng's demand. 
Nevertheless, Deng's allies and supporters in the party fought 
hard on his behalf. Xu Shiyou and Wei Guoqing (two powerful 
regional leaders in the Politburo) and many provincial officials who 
had been associated with Deng or had been brought back to power by 
him in 1975 exerted immense political pressure on Hua to speed up 
Deng's rehabilitation. 
Eventually, a compromise was arranged by Ye Jianying at a 
Central Committee work conference in March 1977. Deng was 
formally reinstated to his three leadership positions in a Central 
Committee plenum in July 1977, but in return he had to make a 
major concession. He wrote a letter to the Central Committee in 
which he pledged his support to Chairman Hua and conceded that he 
had committed political errors in 1975.8 
III. Removing Ideological Constraints 
Once back in the leadership, Deng, with the help of like-minded 
colleagues, kept up the pressure for a revamping of policy and lost no 
time in consolidating his position and expanding his base of support. 
In this connection, it is important to bear in mind that since the 
autumn of 1976, two broad trends have characterized Chinese 
politics. On one hand, there has been a consensus within the 
leadership to depart from Mao's revolutionary radicalism and to 
promote the program of "four modernizations" - i.e., the moderniza-
tion of industry, agriculture, science and technology, and the 
military. On the other hand, the elites have been divided about a 
wide range of crucial political and economic issues which involve not 
only ideology but also power. The resulting conflict has been largely, 
7. The statement appeared first in a joint editorial entitled "Study Well the 
Documents and Grasp the Key Link" in Renmin Ribao, Hongqi, and Jiefangjun Bao 
(all Beijing), Feb. 7, 1977. 
8. See the Communique of the July 1977 Central Committee Plenum, Peking 
Review, July 29, 1977, p. 5. Although the communique did not disclose the contents of 
Deng's two letters or Ye's mediating role, such information had been widely 
disseminated among cadres through inner party channels. 
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but not exclusively, a rivalry between groups led by Hua and those 
led by Deng. 
The coalition under Hua consisted of two diverse elements. 
One was the leftist "whatever" faction, whose members rose to polit-
ical prominence during the GPCR and have had numerous followers 
among the rank and file of the party. Another was the "petroleum" 
faction, a group of economists and technocrats who ran the Chinese 
economy under the late Premier Zhou's stewardship during 1966-76, 
who were credited with the remarkable development of China's pe-
troleum industry, and have been strongly represented in the eco-
nomic ministries of the State Council. According to a Hong Kong 
Communist publication, CCP Vice-Chairman Li Xiannian is its be-
hind-the-scenes leader.9 In addition, the Hua coalition has also 
drawn support from such elder statesmen as Marshal Ye Jianying 
and from a few leaders of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). 
This coalition was in the ascendancy during 1976-77 and largely 
controlled policy councils until the spring of 1978. Indeed, the 
political line of the 11th Party Congress in August 1977 and the 
10-year National Development Plan sanctioned by the Fifth National 
People's Congress (NPC) in March 1978 bore the mark of the 
coalition's influence. 
The coalition behind Deng, on the other hand, has consisted of 
several groups of veteran officials, great numbers of whom were 
victims of the GPCR. Many of them are long-time associates of Deng 
(e.g., Hu Yaobang and Wan Li), some are Deng's peers and political 
allies (e.g., Chen Yun and Peng Zhen), and some are cooptees into 
Deng's group (e.g., Zhao Ziyang, Yang Dezih, and Keng Biao). While 
these groups share intense antagonism toward Mao's legacy, they 
differ on the ways and means of reform and the program of "four 
modernizations." 
It seems appropriate here to note parenthetically that these and 
other leadership groupings or factions are based neither on institu-
tions (e.g., the army or secret police) nor on historical associations 
(e.g., field army ties). Perhaps with the exception of the "petroleum 
faction" which is composed primarily of economic planners and 
"technocrats," other groupings draw their members across the major 
institutional lines and field army affiliations. Whereas allegiance to 
Mao's legacy seems a crucial ingredient that holds together the 
"whatever" faction and sets it apart from other factions, as a rule 
9. Lo Ping, "The NPC Session and the Hu Yaobang-Zhao Ziyang Leadership 
Structure," Chengming (Hong Kong), No. 34, August 1980, pp. 5-7. 
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Chinese factionalism is not ideologically-oriented. Nor are China's 
factions mainly policy-oriented, although they do entertain certain 
policy preferences and such preferences could increase or damage 
support for competing factions or affect factional alignments in 
Chinese politics. Instead, the personal relationship of cadres, as an 
insightful study by Lucian Pye has pointed out, is the primary basis 
for factions in China since the advent of the GPCR. 10 In addition to 
dimensions of Chinese personality and attitudes about authority, 
trust, dependency and other sentiments which Pye attributes to 
lingering influence of Chinese culture which impels the Chinese to 
form close personal networks, Chinese Communist cadres have also 
learned from the abrupt and unpredictable policy and political 
changes in the past decade and half that personal ties and mutual 
help, and not correct ideological stance or institutional loyalty, best 
protect their careers and enhance political power. 
Having close ties with many powerholders in the Party and the 
PLA, and highly experienced in domestic and external affairs, Deng 
clearly possesses personal and political assets unmatched by Hua or 
other Chinese leaders. Besides, his modernization program seems to 
better represent the national mood and enables him to win political 
support. Thus, in the course of leadership infighting, the balance of 
power has gradually but steadily shifted in the favor of Deng's 
coalition. At the 11th CCP Congress, for example, Deng was 
successful in bringing about the return of many veteran officials 
sidelined by the GPCR to the Central Committee and the Politburo.'' 
Hu Yaobang, Deng's closest brain-truster, was appointed director of 
the powerful Central Committee Organization Department. Through 
this key office, Hu was able to do two important things which not 
only boosted enormously Deng's cause but also contributed much to 
Hu's own rapid political ascendency in subsequent years: (1) rehabi-
litation of numerous cadres victimized by the GPCR; and (2) 
dispensation of patronage and placement of supporters in major 
10. Lucian W. Pye, The Dynamics of Factions and Consensus in Chinese Politics: A 
Model and Some Propositions (Santa Monica, Ca.: The Rand Corporation. July 1980l, 
R-2566-AF, pp. 6-7. 
11. Of the Eleventh Central Committee's 201 members and 132 alternate 
members, 73 and 75 respectively are "new"- in the sense that they were not members 
of the Ninth or Tenth Central Committees, elected in 1969 or 1973 - but had been 
ranking officials before the GPCR. Indeed, quite a few were even members of the Eight 
Central Committee, elected in 1956 and 1958. Two thirds of these veterans are Deng's 
associates and allies. In the Politburo, 10 of the 23 members are new, and 6 of them are 
Deng's supporters and allies. 
CoNFLICT IN THE PosT-MAo CHINA 7 
leadership posts. Likewise, Luo Ruiqing, another Deng cohort, was 
named secretary-general of the CCP Military Affairs Commission to 
control over the regime's military matters. Similarly, at the Fifth 
NPC, Deng placed many allies and associates in key positions in the 
State Council - including Zhao Cangbi as Minister of Public 
Security. 
One of the most important and far-reaching tasks which Deng 
and his supporters have sought to accomplish is destruction of the 
cult of Mao and dilution of Mao's ideological authority. In pursuing 
this goal, they had two larger purposes: (1) to remove ideological 
constraints on pragmatic modernization programs, resulting from 
invocation of Mao by the opposition to stonewall against change; (2) 
to undercut the major source of power possessed by Hua, whose claim 
to rule rested on Mao's personal imprimatur. 
With such an objective clearly in mind, the Deng camp, 
masterminded by Hu Yaobang, since the spring of 1978 has been 
promoting a new ideological tenet: "practice is the sole criterion of 
truth."' 2 In plain language, the precept means that any policy, 
including any favored by Mao, should not be venerated as truth if it 
does not work or if it fails to produce positive results. Rather, it 
should be abolished or changed. Deng's clarion call is to "seek truth 
from facts." In a system in which party and state constitutions have 
sanctified Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought as the guiding 
ideology, the idea that Deng has been trying to foster is truly 
iconoclastic and revolutionary. 
As one might expect, Deng's promotion of the new precept 
touched off quite a controversy in the Party. Such top leaders as Hua 
and Y e refused to endorse Deng's formula. The "whatever" faction 
and other defenders of the Maoist legacy attacked Deng for, among 
other things, opposition to the late Chairman and trying to "cut down 
the banner" of Mao Zedong Thought. At the same time, acceptance of 
the need to base policy on actual conditions and to free the Chinese 
people from the dominating influence of Mao's legacy was wide-
spread. During the summer and fall of 1978, for instance, many 
leaders, especially party and PLA leaders in the provinces, contri-
buted articles to the media to register their support for Deng's new 
ideological line. The issue was roundly debated in a Central 
12. This new ideological concept first surfaced in an article in Guangming Ribao 
<Beijing), May 11, 1978. Deng personally promoted it in a mlijor speech to the Political 
Work Conference of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in early June, See Renmin 
Ribao, June 6, 1978. 
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Committee work conference in November 1978. Deng subsequently 
scored a major victory when a Central Committee plenum held 
during the following month "highly evaluated the discussion of 
whether practice is the sole criterion for testing truth."'3 
Deng, however, has not hesitated to invoke Mao to constrain Hua 
and dilute his influence as CCP Chairman. Thus, on July 1, 1978, 
Renmin Ribao published a speech that Mao had delivered to a party 
meeting in January 1962, in which he acknowledged that he had 
made many wrong decisions on the Great Leap and was mainly 
responsible for China's economic disaster during the late 1950s and 
early 1960s. In the same speech, Mao had called for earnest 
implementation of the principle of democratic centralism - namely, 
collegial decision-making in the party committees- to prevent abuse 
of power by individuals. Obviously, Deng publicized the speech to 
show that Mao had not been infallible, and to justify modification of 
policies which Mao had put forth. But by drawing attention to Mao's 
emphasis on the principle of democratic centralism, Deng also sought 
to curtail the power of Hua, who may well have derived special 
prerogatives from his post as CCP Chairman. 
IV. Purging the Adversaries 
Deng and his brain-trust also plainly realize that their pragmatic 
programs aimed at speeding up China's economic growth must have 
the support of substantial numbers of power holders in the leadership. 
Thus, in corijunction with his efforts to legislate a new ideological 
line, Deng has been striving to establish control over the regime's 
decision-making councils and policy-implementation processes by 
pressing a purge of Maoists and of officials antagonistic to his 
policies. 
A concerted campaign that began in January 1978 against the 
"wind faction," "slippery faction," or "faction of quakers" was part of 
such a design. A series of articles which first appeared in Jiefangqun 
Bao and was reprinted in Renmin Ribao mounted stinging attacks on 
those cadres who were political opportunists, who shirked off 
responsibility for past political errors and allegiances, and who hid 
behind the positions of power awaiting an opportunity to create 
political disturbance.14 To put it simply, the targets of the campaign 
13. "Communique of the Third Plenary Session in the 11th Central Committee of 
the Communist Party of China" (adopted on Dec. 2, 19781, Peking Review, Dec. 29, 
1978, p. 15. 
14. Renmin Ribao, Jan. 6, 10, and 15, 1978. 
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were those officials who had once supported and collaborated with the 
gang of four and had then lined up behind Chairman Hua after 
October 1976, or had otherwise dragged their feet on Deng's policies. 
As subsequent developments would show, the campaign was directed 
against at least half a dozen Politburo members, ten provincial first 
party secretaries, and hundreds of other officials of somewhat lower 
rank. 
Chairman Hua, however, resisted Deng's efforts to purge the 
leadership bodies. Aside from the fact that those under attack were 
not only fellow beneficiaries of the GPCR but also his supporters, 
Hua may have reasoned that an expanded purge would divide the 
party ranks, destabilize the political order, and hamper efforts to 
carry out the "four modernizations." Hence, he favored a winding 
down of the campaign. His report to the NPC session in February 
1978, for example, stated that the movement to expose and criticize 
the gang of four had been "sound and vigorous" and that the 
investigation into the individuals and incidents associated with their 
conspiracy to usurp power "had in the main been completed in most 
of the localities and departments." He called for the nation to be 
conciliatory to comrades who "had made mistakes, including serious 
mistakes," so as to "win over all those that can be won over."15 In the 
same vein, Ye Jianying, elected Chairman of the NPC Standing 
Committee in March 1978, subsequently urged his fellow committee 
members at a meeting in September 1978 to strive for national 
stability and unity and admonished each and every one to refrain 
from doing or saying "what isn't good for unity."16 On several 
occasions, moreover, Hua visited, and appeared in public with, 
officials under the gun (e.g., Zeng Shaoshan and Xie Xuegong, party 
first secretaries of Liaoning and Tianjin, respectively, on May 10 and 
11, 1978), in an apparent effort to lend his support and save them 
from ouster. But these undertakings were of no avail. 
Notwithstanding the opposition of Hua and Ye, Deng was able to 
purge those who had collaborated with the gang of four or were 
otherwise antagonistic to his policies, and to consolidate his network 
of support in the provinces. During 1978 alone, eight such province-
level first secretaries and numerous secretaries were dismissed and 
replaced by Deng backers. To be sure, Deng did not fire all of them at 
a stroke. That could have harmed China's image of stability. What he 
15. Peking Review, Mar. 10, 1978, pp. 17-18. 
16. See New China News Agency (Beijing), Sept. 13, 1978; Peking Review, Sept. 
28, 1978, p.3. 
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did, to the contrary, was to undertake carefully controlled surgery. 
He eliminated one or several at a time at intervals of several months. 
Thus, Liu Zihou, Ren Rong and Wang Qian, first secretaries of Hobei, 
Tibet and Shanxi respectively, survived until 1980. Similarly, even 
when Seypidin and Wu De were relieved of their leadership positions 
in Xinjiang and Beijing in January and October 1978 respectively, 
they were allowed to retain their Politburo seats - at least for the 
time being. 
In retrospect, it was at the Central Committee work conference of 
November 11-December 15, 1978, and the followup Central Commit-
tee plenum a few days later that the political forces led by Deng made 
the big breakthrough in their drive to alter the party's ideological 
and organizational features. This was the consequence of a well-
timed political struggle orchestrated by Deng. During the summer 
and fall of 1978, most of the leaders in the provincial party and 
military hierarchy published articles to endorse Deng's ideological 
formula "practice is the sole criterion of truth." 1' As the work 
conference went into session, the Beijing CCP Committee passed a 
resolution to affirm that the Tienanmen Square demonstration of 
April 5, 1976, in honor of the late Premier Zhou, had been a 
"revolutionary" event - thereby making heroes of the people who 
either had taken part in it or were otherwise victimized by it (e.g., 
Deng), and casting a political shadow on Hua and others who took 
actions to suppress it. 18 In the meantime, a spate of Deng-inspired 
big-character posters went up in Beijing's Xidan "Democracy" Wall 
which, among other things, denounced those leaders who were 
responsible for arresting and persecuting the demonstrators, criti-
cized Mao's leadership, and challenged the legitimacy of Hua's 
appointment in the wake of the riots. 19 
In such a political atmosphere, which obviously exerted heavy 
political pressure on the Maoists and was favorable to the Deng 
camp, many important personnel and political changes were effected 
at the conference and the plenum. Four veteran officials - Chen 
Yun, Deng Yingchao (the widow of Zhou Enlai), Hu Yaobang and 
17. See, for instance, articles by Wang Enmao, An Pingsheng, Ren Zhongyi, and 
Wang Feng in Renmin Ribao Sept. 2, 7 and 20, and Nov. 4, 1978; Special 
Commentator, "The Basic Marxist Principle," Ji.efangjun Bao. June 24, 1978. Wang 
Enmao, An, Ren, and Wang Feng were provincial first party secretaries of Jilin, 
Yunnan, Liaoning, and Xinjiang respectively. 
18. Renmin Ribao, Nov. 16, 1978. 
19. See Fox Butterfield's articles in The New York Times, Nov. 17, 26, 27, and 28, 
1978; Jay Mathews' articles in The Washington Post, Nov. 26 and Dec. 5, 1978. 
CoNFLICT IN THE PosT-MAo CHINA 11 
Wang Zhen, all of whom are certain to back Deng on most issues-
were elected to the Politburo. The plenum also added nine veteran 
cadres to the Central Committee; like Deng, all of them had been 
victims of the GPRC.20 
Other personnel changes and appointments were even more 
revealing. Chen Yun was named a CCP Vice-Chairman, a position 
that he had held during 1956-66, and was placed in charge of a 
100-member Central Commission for Inspecting Discipline, which 
was to enforce discipline among party members. Furthermore, he was 
appointed head of an ad hoc Financial and Economic Group, a body 
assigned overall responsibility for China's economic and financial 
policy. This was a highly significant appointment in light of Chen's 
reputation as a seasoned economist, an outspoken critic of Mao's 
radical Great Leap program, and the main architect of China's 
recovery after the Great Leap. 21 One of the specific tasks assigned to 
the group was to map out a three-year readjustment program, for the 
Chinese leaders now concluded that the 10-year National Develop-
ment Plan, which had been formulated chiefly by Hua, Li Xiannian 
and Yu Qiuli and announced at the NPC nine months earlier, was 
unrealistic in its targets and unsound in its emphasis and allocation 
of resources. 
In addition, Deng's closest aide and most important brain-
truster, Hu Yaobang, was named Secretary-General of the CCP 
Central Committee and concurrently Director of the Central Commit-
tee Propaganda Department. In the latter case, he replaced Zhang 
Pinghau, a Hua supporter. Hu yielded his position as Director of the 
Central Committee Organization Department to Song Renqiong, 
another close associate of Deng. As CCP Secretary-General, Hu 
became responsible for daily work at headquarters and supervision of 
20. The nine new Central Committee members were Huang Kezheng, Song 
Renquiong, Hu Qiaomu, Xi Zhongxun, Wang Renzhong, Huang Huoqing, Chen Zaidao, 
Han Guang, and Zhou Hui. According to the 1977 CCP Constitution, Central 
Committee members are elected by the Party Congress, but "in view of the changed 
situation in party life" since the Party Congress and "current urgent needs in party 
work," the Plenum decided, "in a provisional measure," to add these members to the 
Central Committee, "subject to future confirmation" by the 12th Party Congress. See 
Peking Review, Dec. 29, 1978, p. 7. 
21. For an account of Chen Yun's career and his role at the Third Plenum, see 
Parris H. Chang, Power and Policy in China, 2nd and enlarged edition. (University 
Park, Pa.; Pennsylvania State University Press, 1978), pp. 138-39; and Chengming, 
No. 15, January 1971, pp. 21-23, and No. 20, June 1979, pp. 14-16. 
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party organizations at all levels, and was thus better able to push and 
implement the programs favored by the Deng forces. 
According to reports of the Communist press in Hong Kong, 
several Politburo members of the "whatever" faction came under 
strong attack at the meetings for their ties to the radicals and lost 
much of their political influence/2 CCP Vice-Chairman Wang Dong-
xing, who had previously been Director of the Central Committee 
General Office (which oversees vital party files) and had consequent-
ly been able to block the political rehabilitation of such ranking 
leaders as Peng Zhen (former mayor of Beijing and Politburo 
member), yielded the job to Yao Yilin, a close friend of Chen Yun and 
Peng Zhen. Wang was also relieved of command of the 8341 army 
unit, a formidable political weapon. Under Wang, this unit had 
evolved into a special security force - a sort of praetorian guard -
which was in charge of leadership security but operated outside the 
regime's established security apparatus and even ran its own 
espionage network.23 The unit is believed to have been disbanded in 
1979. Others besides Wang who encountered much criticism and a 
loss of influence include Wu De, Ji Dengkui, Chen Xilian, Ni Zhifu 
and Chen Yonggui, all of whom had benefited from the GPCR. 
Although Hua Guofeng retained his post as CCP Chairman then, 
a number of developments at the Central Committee work conference 
and plenum severely weakened his power and influence. First, those 
leaders who had been his supporters or in alliance with him had lost 
much of their power, and the party machinery came under the control 
of Deng's men. Second, he lost many of the prerogatives of Chairman. 
The plenum placed a new empahsis on collective leadership, and it 
prohibited him from issuing "an instruction" without a collegial 
decision.24 Third, he had to make a self-criticism at the Central 
Committee work conference, in which he admitted a number of 
political errors, including failure to act on Deng's rehabilitation in 
good time.25 Fourth, without saying so, the CCP discarded the 
ideological and political line that Hua had put forth at the 11th Party 
Congress in 1977 and at the NPC in 1978. Not only did the plenum 
fail to endorse his "strategic decision to grasp the key link of class 
struggle and bring about great order across the land" (Hua's political 
22. Chi Hsin, "The CCP Made a Drastic Turn," The Seventies <Hong Kongl, No. 
109, February 1979, p. 8 and Chengming, No. 15, January 1979, p. 18. 
23. Chang, Power and Policy in China, op. cit., pp. 234-36. 
24. See the communique of the Third Plenum, loc. cit., p. 16. 
25. Hu Jiwei, loc. cit., p. 62; see also Chi Hsin, loc. cit., p. 8. 
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line after 1977) and the 10-year National Development Plan, but the 
plenum communique was even conspicuously silent on the campaigns 
to learn from Taching and from Tazhai, both of which Hua had 
actively promoted as late as February 1978, when he exhorted the 
nation to work hard to ensure that "by 1980 one third of our 
enterprises become Taching-type enterprises and one third of our 
counties Tachai-type counties."26 
At the same time, the plenum endorsed Deng's ideological 
precept of seeking truth from facts and voted to declare the April 
1976 Tienanmen demonstration a revolutionary event and to revoke 
the documents that the Central Committee had issued supporting the 
anti-Deng campaign and condemning the Tienanmen demonstration. 
It also overturned past verdicts on the late Marshal Peng Dehuai and 
many other leaders purged by Mao and the Maoists, although it put 
off decisions on the rehabilitation of two of the most prominent 
Maoist victims, Peng Zhen and the late head of state, Liu Shaoqi. It 
even made a limited, implicit, but unprecedented public criticism of 
Mao, stating that "it would not be Marxist to demand that a 
revolutionary leader be free of all shortcomings and errors," nor 
would it "conform to comrade Mao Zedong's consistent evaluation of 
himself." Nevertheless, it decided to postpone assessment of the 
"shortcomings and mistakes" of the GPCR and called on the party to 
shift its energies to the task of modernization. 27 
It is of interest that in the last stage of the Central Committee 
work conference, Peking and Washington reached an agreement on 
diplomatic normalization, largely on the terms upon which the 
Chinese government had insisted. This diplomatic breakthrough 
could have strengthened the position of Deng, who had charge of the 
negotiations, within leadership circles at a crucial juncture. It seems 
likely that the Carter administration was aware of the struggle 
taking place inside Chinese policy councils and went ahead with 
normalization and issued the invitation to Deng to visit the United 
States with an eye towards influencing China's leadership conflict 
and towards helping the cause of a pragmatic leader. 
V. Consolidation of Power 
After the Third Central Committee Plenum in December 1978, 
Vice-Chairman Deng emerged as the most powerful man in China 
26. Peleing Review, Mar. 10, 1978, p. 20. 
27. See note 24, supra. 
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and the main architect of China's modernization programs. Moreover, 
his triumphant tour of the United States in January-February 1979 
boosted his prestige enormously. Nevertheless, a series of develop-
ments afforded Deng's opponents an opportunity to mount a strong 
attack on his leadership and policies. 
First, the poster campaign that the veteran officials had inspired 
and exploited in the fall of 1978 had acquired a momentum of its own, 
going far beyond what they had apparently intended. In the winter 
months of 1978-79, there was not only an increased outpouring of 
posters but also a burgeoning of many underground dissident 
publications in Beijing and throughout China. Aside from demanding 
democracy and human rights, quite a few posters and articles 
expressed doubts about socialism, attacked repressive Communist 
rule, and even went so far as to challenge the legitimacy of the 
leading role of the CCP. Accompanying the rise of the dissident 
movement were demonstrations by petitioners and sit-ins by discon-
tented students, unemployed youths, and others in Beijing and 
various other Chinese cities, as many social elements besieged the 
authorities with their grievances. 
Second, China's punitive action against the Hanoi government in 
the Sino-Vietnamese war of February-March 1979 did not proceed as 
smoothly as the CCP leadership had anticipated. The heavy losses 
sustained by Chinese troops generated a great deal of second-
guessing and controversy within leadership circles."8 Third, the 
devaluation of Mao, the reversal of verdicts with respect to victims of 
the GPCR, the new emphasis on material incentives and the role of 
experts and intellectuals, and the regime's overall liberalization 
created turmoil within party ranks. Not only did it generate 
considerable confusion and cynicism, but it also severely antagonized 
those whose interests were at stake. 
Taking advantage of such circumstances, the Maoists in the 
leadership sought to reassert themselves. and launched an offensive 
against Deng and his policies, especially those adopted at the Third 
Central Committee Plenum. According to the Communist press in 
Hong Kong, a number of provincial party secretaries and State 
Council ministers who apparently felt their vested interests 
threatened by Deng's new policies joined the attack.29 This coalition 
28. See Renmin Ribao editorial, Mar. 26, 1979; see also Jiefangjun Bao editorial, 
Mar. 26, 1979, as translated in Foreign Broadcasting Information Service, Daily 
Report: People's Republic of China (Washington, D.C.), Mar. 27, 1979. 
29. Lu Chung-chien, "The Victory of the Pragmatic Faction as seen from the June 
1979 NPC Session," Chengming, No. 21, July 1979, pp. 5-6. 
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charged that the Third Plenum had "negated Chairman Mao" and 
"cut down the banner of Mao Zedong Thought," labeled Deng 
"rightist" and "revisioni~t," and blamed Deng's promotion of liber-
alization for causing social turmoil and undermining stability and 
unity.30 
Confronted with this challenge, Deng felt compelled to take a 
step backward. In a speech to an enlarged Politburo session Cln March 
30, 1979, he expressed strong support of the need to "uphold the 
socialist road, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the leadership of the 
party, and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought (the so-called 
"four upholds" or "four basic principles.").31 
Consequently, the Chinese authorities carried out a crackdown 
on democracy and on human rights activities and tightened political 
and social control. Several of the more outspoken underground 
journals were closed down, and some dissidents - including Wei 
Jingsheng and Fu Yuehua, who have received much attention in the 
Western media32 -were placed under arrest. In quick succession in 
March and April, many provinces, in the name of maintaining 
stability and unity, issued notices banning demonstrations and 
posters critical of the Party. 
However, the left "adverse current" failed to reverse Deng's 
major policies and did not deter him from continuing his efforts to 
consolidate his position within the leadership. The opposition did not 
succeed in accomplishing its end because it no longer carried 
sufficient political weight in policy councils. Moreover, Deng clearly 
enjoyed political backing of an extensive nature throughout the 
system and was able to mobilize the necessary support to prevail. For 
example, a large number of provincial party and PLA leaders spoke 
up in support of his policies and attacked his critics in May and June 
1979.33 
30. The viewpoints of Deng's critics are alluded to and refuted by many articles. 
See, for instance, "Use the Spirit of the Third Plenum to Unify Our Thinking," an 
editorial commentary in Wenhui Bao (Shanghai), Apr. 13, 1979; and "Distinguish the 
Two Ideological Lines; Uphold the Four Basic Principles," by a "guest commentator" in 
Guangming Ribao, May 11, 1979. 
31. Studies on Chinese Communism <Taipei), May 15, 1979, p. 22. 
32. See The New York Times, Oct. 17 and 18, and Nov. 12, 1979, for dispatches by 
its Beijing correspondent Fox Butterfield; see also Jay Matthews' dispatch from Beijing, 
The Washington Post, Oct. 26, 1979. 
33. The Deng-controlled media had prominently reported the remarks and 
speeches of the officials. For example, see Renmin Ribao, May 23 (Zhao Ziyang), May 
28 <Liao Hanaheng), Firat Political Commissar ofNanjing Military Region), May 29 (Li 
Desheng, Commander of Mukden Military Region), June 2 (Wan Li, First Secretary, 
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By then, it appears that Deng had solidified his position 
sufficiently to forge ahead again. Thus, Peng Zhen's long-awaited 
rehabilitation was carried out, and at the Second Session of the Fifth 
NPC in June, Peng was named a NPC vice-chairman and director of 
the NPC's Legal Commission, with responsibility for restructuring 
China's legal system. At the same session, three veteran economists 
- Chen Yun, Yao Yilin and Bo Yibo - were elected vice premiers. 
Three months later, the Fourth Central Committee Plenum, held on 
September 25-28, elevated Peng Zhen to the Politburo; promoted 
Zhao Ziyang, an alternate member of the Politburo, to full member-
ship; and elected 12 more victims of the GPCR purge to the Central 
Committee.34 In addition, the plenum discussed and approved a major 
policy document which reviewed the three decades of Communist rule 
and addressed controversial issues which the Third Plenum had 
sidestepped, such as Mao's leadership errors and defects of the CPCR. 
The document is said to have been drafted by CCP Secretary-General 
Hu Yaobang in June, circulated widely among the party cadres for 
comments, and revised by Deng and Ye before it was finally 
approved. Y e's speech on September 29 at a Beijing rally in 
celebration of the 30th anniversary of the founding of the People's 
Republic was based on the document.35 
The ascendancy of Deng and his supporters was manifested once 
again when the Fifth Plenum met behind closed doors February 
23-29, 1980, to deliberate on major policy and personnel matters. This 
plenum approved the posthumous rehabilitation of Liu Shaoqi (Mao's 
chief antagonist during the GPCR), which had been an issue of 
intense controversy within the leadership for some time.36 It also 
Anhui CCP Committee), and June 9 (Song Ping, First Secretary, Gansu CCP 
Committee), 1979. On May 22, the paper reproduced a Jiefangjun Bao 'commentator's 
article of the previous day which attacked Deng's critics and called for PLA cadres to 
resolutely support and implement policies adopted at the Third Plenum. 
34. With these additions, virtually every member or alternate member of the 
Eight Central Committee who is still alive has returned to the Central Committee. The 
few exceptions collaborated with the Lin Biao and the gang of four groups. 
35. Lo Ping, "Developments in the Party After the Fourth CC Plenum," 
Chengming, No. 25, November 1979, pp. 5-6. Reportedly, divergent views persisted 
among the elites on the assessment of post-1957 Communist rule. Consequently, the 
antagonists had to compromise on or avoid some of the most controversial issues. For 
Ye's speech, see Beijing Review, Oct. 5, 1979, pp. 7-32. 
36. Several major political obstacles are said to have blocked the rehabilitation of 
China's "Khrushchev," the label pinned on Liu during the GPCR, prior to the Fifth 
Plenum. One was that the investigation report of the 1968 Central Committee 
resolution which had condemned Liu as a "traitor, renegade, and scab" had been based 
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made sweeping leadership changes. These included the ouster of four 
leaders of the "whatever" faction- Wang Dongxing, Wu De, Chen 
Xilian, and Ji Dengkui - from the Politburo; the elevation of two 
close associates of Deng, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, to the 
Politburo's Standing Committee; and the reestablishment of the CCP 
Central Committee Secretariat and the appointment of Hu Yaobang 
to be General Secretary and ten other veteran officials, most of them 
Deng's associates and allies, to be secretaries to manage the daily 
affairs of the Party.37 
The four diehard Maoists had been targeted for removal by Deng 
since 1976, and, as previously noted, they had come under strong 
attack at the Third Central Committee Plenum. Deng had tempor-
ized, possibly because he lacked sufficient power or because he 
wanted to avoid a divisive leadership fight that could endanger 
resolution of more pressing issues. HowevP.r, efforts to preserve an 
appearance of leadership unity and resurgence of the Left in the 
following spring had produced a curious sense of political uncertainty 
in party ranks and had emboldened many cadres to oppose or drag 
their feet on the programs that the Deng group wanted to pursue. 
Hence, Deng had decided to strike against them immediately rather 
than to wait until the next party congress. 
VI. Grooming China's Future Leaders 
It is no secret that because of Deng's advanced age, many cadres 
had adopted a wait-and-see attitude toward his pragmatic programs. 
They feared that just as the post-Mao leadership had done away with 
on a report compiled by an ad hoc investigative group headed by the late Zhou Enlai. 
Zhou, during 1977-78, had acquired the status of a new Communist saint in China, 
and his name may have been invoked to block the restoration of Liu's honor. Another 
major obstacle was opposition by Ye Jianying. Ye had to be confronted with new 
evidence assembled by Liu's defenders showing that Kang Sheng had actually 
controlled the investigative group, had extorted false charges from Liu's associates by 
coercion and torture, and had framed Liu. CKang, a party vice-chairman who died in 
1975, has been expelled from the Party posthumously). Apparently, Ye agreed to Liu's 
rehabilitation grudgingly, and when Deng held a memorial service for Liu on May 17, 
1980, an event attended by virtually every top official, Ye chose to boycott it. Another 
notable absentee was Xu Shiyou. 
Information on the controversy described above is based partly on a quite 
revealing editorial, "Restore the True Feature of Mao Zedong Thought - on Liu 
Shaoqi's Rehabilitation," Renmin Ribao, May 16, 1980, and partly on stories 
circulating inside China which, in the opinion of the author, seem highly reliable. 
37. See the Communique of the CCP's Fifth Central Committee Plenum, Beijing 
Review, Mar. 10, 1980, pp. 7-10. · 
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Mao's programs, Deng's successors might scrap his "revisionist" line 
and punish those who implemented it. To remove such reservations 
once and for all and to prevent his adversaries from taking over the 
leadership in the future, Deng has sought to structure his succession 
in advance and to put into positions of power a group of possible 
successors committed to his line and likely to continue his policies 
after he is gone. . 
With this objective in mind, Deng installed his closest aide, Hu 
Yaobang, as head of the Central Committee Secretariat and staffed 
the Secretariat mostly with his supporters, whom he expects to hold 
aloft his banner after he is out of the political picture. As a day-to-day 
decision-making body, the Secretariat would run the Party and 
preempt many of Hua's functions as CCP Chairman. Deng's evident 
design then was to dilute Hua's control over policy and the party 
organization, and eventually to ease him out of the chairmanship and 
replace him with his own man, Hu Yaobang. Like Deng, Hu is 
pragmatic, talented and imaginative, and he is also blessed with 
extensive ties with the powerholders in the system. 
As with the party councils, Deng has steadily packed the State 
Council with his own backers and ousted his opponents. The NPC 
Standing Committee in April 1980 appointed two of Deng's suppor-
ters, Zhao Ziyang and Wan Li, to be vice-premiers and relieved Chen 
Xilian and Ji Dengkui of their posts as vice-premiers. Deng's next 
goal was to force Premier Hua Guofeng out of the State Council and 
to replace him with Zhao Ziyang. At 62, Zhao is a highly pragmatic 
and experienced former provincial official, with a very successful 
record as the leader of Sichuan, China's most populous province 
(population over 100 million). Although he was not too closely 
associated with Deng before the GPCR (as were Hu Yaobang, Wan 
Li, and others), his pragmatism, his good record in Sichuan, and 
especially his strong backing of Deng's programs apparently impress-
ed Deng a great deal; hence, he has been coopted into the Deng camp. 
To no one's surprise, the NPC in September 1980 approved Hua's 
resignation as premier and appointed Zhao as his replacement. 
The same NPC session also confirmed the expected resignations 
of seven vice-premiers. These individuals included Deng Xiaoping, 
Chen Yun, Li Xiannian, Xu Xiangqian, Wang Zhen, Wang Renzhong, 
and Chen Y ongqui. Thereafter the State Council is in the hands of 
Premier Zhao and senior Vice-Premier Wan Li. According to the 
official view, all the resignations except that of Chen Yongqui, who 
was in political disgrace (and was actually fired) were either designed 
to separate party and government functions (as in the cases of Hua 
CoNFLICT IN THE PosT-MAo CHINA 19 
and Wang Renzhong) or due to advanced age (which applies to the 
rest).38 Obviously, this explanation contains more than a grain of 
truth. There have been consistent efforts in recent years to eliminate 
over-concentrations of power and to infuse leadership bodies at all 
levels with younger blood and competent cadres. But such motiva-
tions alone do not account for the changes. Deng instigated these 
changes in part to undercut his adversaries. That Deng has 
maneuvered Hua into giving up his government post is already quite 
well established.39 What is little understood outside China, however, 
is that Deng, by offering to step down from his government post on 
many occasions, had sought to induce (if not compel) Vice-Premier Li 
Xiannian to follow suit. Li, China's top economic official during 
1966-78, had not seen eye to eye with the modernization programs 
promoted by Deng and Deng's ally Chen Yun, and he had apparently 
encouraged the "petroleum" faction to stonewall against Deng/Chen 
attempts to readjust economic plans.40 Li's departure from the State 
Council (although he remains a CCP vice-chairman) is likely to 
weaken the influence of the "petroleum" faction in the State Council, 
and correspondingly strengthen the position of Deng's backers. 
As a matter of fact, since the summer of 1980 several official 
identified with the "petroleum" faction have come under heavy fire 
from the Deng camp for their opposition to the readjustment 
program. Yu Qiuli, a vice-premier concurrently director of the 
powerful State Planning Commission, yielded his Planning Commis-
sion post to Vice-Premier Yao Yilin and became head of the less 
important State Energy Commission. Deng's supporters also seized 
upon the death of 72 workers in the capsizing of an offshore oil rig in 
1979 to mount a strong attack on officials of the "petroleum" faction. 
As a result of this attack, Petroleum Minister Song Zhenming 
suffered summary dismissal, Vice-Premier Kang Shien received a 
"demerit of the first grade" (a severe public reprimand), and Yu Qiuli 
had to make a humiliating self-criticism,.' Apparently inspired by the 
38. Beijing Review, Sept. 15, 1980. 
39. Beginning in 1979, for example, Deng, through interviews with foreign 
visitors and inspired press leaks, had expressed his desire to resign from the post of 
vice-premier and had conducted a campaign to "persuade" Hua to relinquish his 
premiership. 
40. See note 9, supra. 
41. The actions taken against Song and Kang were prominently reported in the 
Chinese media. See, for instance, "A Profound Lesson," Renmin Ribao, Aug. 27, 1980. 
However, the news that Yu made a self-criticism has not been publicly divulged, 
although it has been known to many inside China. 
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Deng camp, delegates at the September 1980 NPC session and a 
spate of newspaper articles criticized the gigantic Baoshan Steel 
project and other major construction undertakings for waste, faulty 
investment plans and other deficiencies. It was perhaps no accident 
that officials responsible for these projects were associated with the 
"petroleum" faction. Furthermore, the alleged backstage boss of the 
faction, Li Xiannian, was not spared. He was the target of attack in 
the big-character posters in Beijing in the fall of 1980; and at the 
Central Work Conference in December, he was compelled to recant 
his errors and the text of his lengthy self-criticism was subsequently 
disseminated. 42 
In addition, Deng, who undoubtedly believes Mao's celebrated 
dictum that political power grows from the barrel of a gun, has made 
special efforts to establish control over the military. Soon after his 
reinstatement as PLA Chief of Staff in the summer of 1977, he began 
to place his supporters in key military posts. For example, Wei 
Guoqing was appointed Director of the General Political Department; 
Luo Ruiqing was made Secretary-General of the Military Affairs 
Commission; and Yang Y ong was named Deputy Chief of Staff. (Yang 
Chengwu, who had served as defacto Chief of Staff prior to Deng's 
return but has not been close to Deng, was transferred to the post of 
Fuzhou Military Region commander). At the same time, Deng 
undertook to purge many PLA officials (e.g., Chen Xilian) who had 
collaborated with the gang of four or had opposed his policies, and to 
replace those he considered inept or too old. Indeed, many old PLA 
cadres have now been relieved of their leadership positions and serve 
only as advisers to various military bodies!3 
Today, many veteran military men are highly apprehensive 
because the military modernization program put forth under Deng's 
aegis threatens their careers with its aim to retire "dead wood" in 
favor of younger officers. Furthermore, there is widespread discontent 
within military ranks about de-Maoization and other "revisionist" 
measures Deng and his associates have promoted since the Third 
CCP Central Committee Plenum in 1978. Some PLA leaders who 
42. See Pi Yun, "Required Readings for the Party Cadres- Speeches of the Four 
Top Party Leaders," Chengming, no. 40, A February 1981, p. 15. 
43. By the summer of 1980, more than 10,000 PLA ranking cadres, including such 
officials as Deputy Chief of Staff Li Da, Deputy Air Force Commanders Xue Shaoqing 
and Kuang Rennong, and Fuzhou Military Region Political Commissar Li Zhimin, had 
stepped down from the leadership posts and become "advisers." See Huang Jung-yueh, 
"Military Cadre Problems," Studies on Chinese Communism (Taipei), Aug. 15, 1980, p. 
117. 
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supported Deng's rehabilitation - notably Xu Shiyou - apparently 
retain profound personal loyalty to Chairman Mao. They have 
expressed strong reservations about sullying the memory of the late 
Chairman, who was very much like a father to them despite all of his 
failures and mistakes:4 
To cope with these problems, Deng has employed a variety of 
means. He has pushed a campaign to strengthen political work and 
"ideological education" among PLA officers and soldiers. Perhaps to 
persuade the discontented cadres to support his policy of abolishing 
life-long cadre tenure, Deng himself stepped down as Chief of Staff in 
early 1980 and appointed Yang Dezhi, commander of Kunming 
Military Region, as his successor. Since Yang had not been seen 
particularly close to Deng but had performed well in China's war over 
Xu Shiyou probably disarmed many of Deng's critics. Most important 
of all, however, Deng has carried a big political stick and has not 
hesitated to use it when necessary. In the past three years or so, 
sweeping leadership changes have been made in the PLA hierarchy, 
from the center down to the provinces. For instance, 10 out of China's 
11 military regions have new commanders (the only Maoist-era 
holdover is Li Desheng of Mukden Military Region, in Manchuria), 
and the first political commissars in all eleven military regions are 
also new. In addition, new appointees command 22 out of China's 28 
province-level military districts!5 Through these reshuffies, Deng 
appears to have strengthened his control, although criticism of, and 
resistance to, the current party line have continued. 
VII. A Big Push for Reforms and Against Hua 
Since the Spring of 1980, opposition to Deng and his programs 
notwithstanding, the Deng forces have clearly dominated China's 
political scene, preempted policy initiatives and shaped events 
largely according to their own script. On the policy front, the most 
44. See "Persist in Four Basic Principles and Continuously Emancipate Our 
Thought," Jiefangjun Bao, Apr. 30, 1979, as reprinted in Renmin Ribao, May 3, 1979, 
and the editorial in Jiefangjun Bao, Aug. 1, 1980, as transmitted by New China News 
Agency (Beijing), Aug. 1, 1980. For Xu Shiyou's ambivalent attitude toward 
de-Maoization, see his article "Chairman Mao Lives Forever in Our Hearts," Hongqi, 
September 1978. 
45. These statistics were culled by the author from Chinese national and 
provincial press reports, and the compilation is believed accurate through the fall of 
1980. 
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important initiative of the Deng camp was to institute urgent 
political and institutional reforms. 
For instance, Deng and his supporters convened an enlarged 
Politburo meeting during August 18-23, 1980, to deliberate on the 
reforms of Party and state leadership system. On August 18, Deng 
gave a keynote speech in which he called for (1) reforms, among 
others, against bureaucracy, life tenure of cadres, over-concentration 
of power, (2) steps to promote democracy, collective leadership and to 
strengthen socialist legal system, and most important of all, (3) a 
large-scale program to cultivate and promote cadres who are young, 
better educated and professionally more competent.46 To make room 
for the younger cadres at the leadership councils, according to Deng's 
proposal, veteran Party leaders in the CC and Politburo would move 
to a central advisory committee (to be established upon the revision 
of the CCP constitution) which would play mainly advisory and 
supervisory functions. A similar advising body would also be created 
in the State Council for the aging governmental officials. 
In addition, Deng also proposed the reform of the economic 
system. For example, changes are to be made on the economic 
structure and the excessive centralization of control over economic 
decisions in the government, and enterprises would be delegated 
greater power. Going hand in hand with a greater emphasis on 
experts are new management setup and greater participation by 
workers designed to improve efficiency and productivity as well as to 
strengthen accountability. 
According to a CC circular, participants of the enlarged Politburo 
meeting "unanimously agreed with the contents and spirit of comrade 
Deng Xiaoping's speech," and submitted "many good supplementary 
and amendatory opinions."47 Subsequently, on August 31, a revised 
text of Deng's speech was approved by the Politburo and on 
September 11 issued as a CC document (No. 66) for dissemination 
and discussion among party ranks. They were urged to convey their 
views and suggestions to the Party center by October 15, so that the 
CC, the NPC Standing Committee, and the State Council could 
incorporate their inputs in the course of enacting new laws or 
regulations. In the fall of 1980, China's mass media went on a blitz to 
46. The full text of Deng's speech is reproduced in Studies on Chinese Commun-
ism, July 15, 1981, pp. 108-139. 
47. Ibid., pp. 106-107. 
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publicize and promote Deng's reform proposals!" Many Deng brain-
trusters also went around various forums to explicate and campaign 
for his reform program.'9 
While the Dengists were pushing for enactment of his reform 
proposals, they also set the stage to oust Hua from the CCP 
chairmanship. Soon after Hua stepped down as Premier in September 
1980, they began to mount an attack on Hua's political and policy 
errors in the media, although he was not attacked by name then. 
There is no question that many of Deng's supporters resented the fact 
that Hua remained CCP Chairman, even if he was only in office and 
not really in power, for they saw him as the last vestige of Mao's 
legacy. A two-part article by a pro-Deng historian, Li Honglin in 
Renmin Ribao on September 18 and 19, 1980, openly questioned the 
legitimacy ofHua's succession to Chairman Mao in 1976. Hua's major 
justification for taking over Mao's mantle was that he had been 
handpicked by Mao. As evidence, he has cited Mao's purported 
statement that "with you in charge, I am at ease." The Renmin R ibao 
article, however, said that "the system of succession which puts the 
political destiny of a country in the hands of one man alone is 
extremely dangerous." "The power of a leader," it went on, "is 
bestowed by the people;" therefore, "he has no right to appoint the 
successor to his post, which does not belong to him." Furthermore, not 
only had portraits of Mao been removed from public places since 
mid-August, but some pictures of Hua had also been taken down. The 
most prominent one was that in Beijing's Central Railway Station, 
which showed Hua and Mao together and symbolically represented 
Mao's handing-over of the leadership to Hua. 
As the late Chairman used to pontificate, a revolutionary leader 
is not appointed; he has to emerge from the struggle. Hua's problem 
has been that, despite his elevation to the Party Chairmanship under 
the political exigencies of 1976, he failed to prevail in the subsequent 
48. For examples, see Special Commentator, '"An Important Reform on the Party 
and State Leadership System," Renmin Ribao, October 28, 1980, and "Discussions on 
promotion of Systemic Reform" in Guangming Ribao, October 16, 17 and 19, 1980. 
49. See a speech by Feng Wenbin (Vice-President of the CC Party Schooll, "On 
Questions of Socialist Democracy," Renmin Ribao, November 24, 1980 Ca condensed 
version is also in Beijing Review, January 26, 1981, pp. 17-20, 28, under the heading 
"Reforming the Political Structure.") See also a speech by Liao Gailong (member of the 
office of Policy Research of the CC Secretariat) entitled "The Historical Experience and 
the Path of Our Development" addressed to a "Forum on CCP History" attended by 
theoretians from the party schools across the nation (section Four of his length speech 
is published in The Seventies, no. 134, March 1981, pp. 38-48>. 
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struggles and thereby to prove that he deserved to be China's 
supreme leader. A number of factors account for Hua's difficulties. 
Because his training was limited and his leadership experience was 
confined largely to provincial politics prior to the 1970's, Hua had not 
been equal to the tasks thrust upon him. Indeed, his performance as 
Party Chairman and Premier during 1976-80 was highly undisting-
uished. Moreover, in a system like China's, where personal ties are 
the cement of political power, Hua simply lacks extensive networks of 
such links with China's powerholders in the party and the PLA. True, 
he did have the support of the "whatever" faction and of leaders like 
Ye Jainying and Li Xiannian, but such support had not been 
sufficient to enable him to meet Deng's challenge. 
Besides, Hua has had a few skeletons in the closet, hence was 
politically vulnerable. For example, he is widely believed to have 
closely collaborated with the "gang of four" prior to Mao's death and, 
as Minister of Public Security in 1976, he played an important part in 
suppressing the Tienanmen Square demonstration of April 1976. 
Thus, the trial of the "gang of four," which began in Beijing on 
November 20, 1980, may have been used by the Deng camp as the 
coup de grace against Hua. Although Hua was not a defendant 
himself and was even instrumental in the arrest of the radical 
leaders, the trial constituted the prelude to his ouster as Party 
Chairman as it was bound to produce evidence that would ruin his 
political career. He made a deal and consented to stE:lP down. 
In fact, between November 13 and December 5, 1980, the 
Politburo held several meetings to denounce Hua. The bill of 
particulars against Hua included: resistance to the reinstatement of 
Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun and other GPCR purge victims; accepting 
and fostering the personality cult around himself while continuing 
Mao's personality cult of the past through the promotion of the 
"two-whatever's" policy; impetuously seeking quick results in econo-
mic work and pushing certain leftist policies; and suppressing the 
discussion on the criterion of truth. 50 Reportedly Hua was twice forced 
to make self-criticism, conceding his errors, and agreed to step down 
as CCP Chairman. In the end, the Politburo is said to have decided: 
(1) to immediately suspend Hua from the leadership work as 
Chairman of both the Party CC and Military Affairs Commission 
(MAC), and to recommend to the Sixth CC Plenum that Hua be 
removed from the Chairmanship of the Party CC and MAC, and be 
50. Shu ping, "An Analysis of the 6th Plenary Session of the 11th Party 
Congress," Studies on Chinese Communism, July 15, 1981, p. 22. 
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demoted to Party vice-chairman; and !2l to empower Hu Yaobang and 
Deng Xiaoping to henceforth take charge of the Party CC and MAC, 
respectively and to recommend to the Sixth CC Plenum that Hu and 
Deng be appointed Chairman of the Party CC and MAC, respectively. 
VIII. Backlash and Compromise 
Until the fall of 1980, Deng was able to call the shots and 
dominate the political scene. However, the opening of the trial of the 
"gang of four" and Lin Biao's followers (including four top PLA 
generals) marked a sudden change of political climate in China, as 
opposition to the Deng camp quickly coalesced. Emboldened, Hua 
shifted his tact and openly challenged Deng's plan to unseat him. He 
refused to attend a Central Work Conference in the second half of 
December, which was supposed to endorse his resignation and 
approve Hu Yaobang as his successor. Hua also boycotted the Party's 
New Year's Day reception at Peking's Great People's Hall in order to 
embarrass his detractors who had wanted to create an appearance of 
leadership harmony and orderly transfer of power. 
Moreover, behind the scene Hua sought to mobilize the support of 
his allies and sympathizers in the leadership. One of Hua's powerful 
defenders has been Marshal Ye Jianying, Party Vice-Chairman, who 
collaborated with Hua to topple the radicals and put Hua at the top 
in October 1976. Ye not only boycotted the December Central Work 
Conference, but also stayed away from Beijing for almost half a year 
to disassociate himself with Deng's decision and display his opposi-
tion to Deng's power play. As can be expected, Hua also drew support 
from those officials who owed their positions to Hua or those who rose 
to political prominence during the GPCR, and from the diehard 
Maoists. 
Even veteran Party officials, including those who were the 
victims of the GPCR, also resented the reforms pushed by the Deng 
forces and chose to block Hua's ouster. Many of these cadres have 
faulted individual leaders like Mao, Lin Biao and the "gang of four" 
(but not the communist system itself) for the GPCR and the 
difficulties faced by the regime today and sought to restore the 
pre-1966 system and policy.51 Peng Zhen is known to be a representa-
tive figure of this "restorationist" school of thought. He and his 
colleagues are said to oppose the "revisionist" reforms on the political 
51. See Wang Juntao (a student of Peking University!, "An Analysis of China's 
Past, Present and Future," The Seventies, no. 134, March 1981, p. 69. 
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system and leadership structure promoted by Deng, Hu, and Zhao 
Ziyang. 
Moreover, not a few officers of the PLA who opposed Deng on 
various grounds also lined up behind Hua. They included those who 
were disaffected by the cuts in military expenditures; those who were 
resentful of Deng's repudiation of the GPCR and campaign for 
de-Maoization and "revisionist" economy policy; those veteran officers 
whose careers have been threatened by Deng's plan to retire the aged 
and promote the young; and a large group of PLA officers, including 
former associates of Lin Biao, who also felt the public trial of four 
generals had tarnished the image of the PLA and were angry at Deng 
and other party officials who had pushed for the trial. 
Confronted with such strong combined opposition, Deng and his 
supporters beat a hasty retreat. Thus the sentencing of the "gang of 
four" and other culprits was delayed for more than three weeks as a 
result of bitter debate inside the Party leadership, and the plan to put 
their accomplice on trial has been postponed indefinitely, if not 
altogether abandoned. The Sixth Central Committee Plenum which 
was originally scheduled for late December 1980, and then February 
1981, to formalize Hua's resignation and Hu's promotion had to be 
postponed again and again amid the deepening political crisis and 
other signs of uncertainty. Consequently, China's political pendulum 
began to swing to the left. 
Indeed, since the winter months of 1980-1981, Chinese author-
ities have once again clamped down on the democracy activists as 
well as on intellectuals who have enjoyed relative freedom in recent 
years in Deng's garden of "hundred flowers." Apparently trying to 
appease his critics inside the Party and undoubtedly worried by the 
nation's sagging economy, high inflation and huge deficit, anti-
government protests, civil disobedience, and other signs of social and 
political unrest (including attempts by workers to organize the 
Polish-style independent labor unions), Deng gave the first signal of a 
crackdown in a harsh speech at the December 1980 Central Work 
Conference.52 Following Deng's speech, the Party issued a new set of 
guidelines in February 1981, known as the No. 7 Central Document, 
that imposed strict restrictions on the intellectual freedom of writers 
and artists, and prescribed that their writings and artistic creations 
52. Michael Weisskopf, "China Ends a Fling at Free Thinking," Washington Post, 
March 23, 1981, pp. 1, 10; see also Tsai Dan-yeh, "Chinese Communist Literary Policy: 
From Liberalization to New Clampdown," Studies on Chinese Communism, April 15, 
1981, p. 78. 
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must conform to the four basic principles of "party leadership, 
socialism, Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, and proletarian 
dictatorship." A subsequent Party directive, the No. 9 Central 
Document, instructed the authorities to stamp out underground 
publications and unofficial organizations.53 In April 1981, the crack-
down was well under way as a number of dissidents including Xu 
Wenli, the editor of a prominent underground journal, AprilS Forum, 
which had already ceased publication in 1980, and Wang Xize, one of 
the authors of the "Li Ize" essay in 1974, were placed under arrest. 
In addition, Deng has been forced to postpone or call ofT 
important reforms which he and his supporters were actively 
promoting as recent as the summer and fall of 1980. For example, the 
highly publicized plan to reform the leadership system - to do away 
with the life-long tenure of cadres and to fix the length of time the 
leading cadres can serve - has to be shelved. Also the program to 
promote to leadership posts younger cadres and experts provoked 
considerable opposition from those affected, especially the PLA 
cadres; consequently it has not been implemented in earnest. 
Moreover, since early 1981, the publicity on the reform of economic 
system in the media has been turned ofT and the policy to decentralize 
decision-making power from the central authorities has been under 
heavy criticism; and in some cases where decision-making powers 
were given to enterprises have been rescinded. 
The publication of a highly pro-Mao article in the Liberation 
Army Daily on April 10 (and in other major Chinese papers the 
following day) by General Huang Kecheng, formerly a PLA Chief of 
Staff (purged in 1959) and currently the Executive Secretary of the 
Party's Central Commission for Inspecting Discipline, also represents 
a setback on the efforts at de-Maoization. It is true that the article 
did criticize Mao for his mistakes in launching the Great Leap in the 
late 1950s and the GPCR during 1966-76; however, the criticisms 
were quite mild and the article actually tried to minimize Mao's onus 
by placing the blame of these two major policy disasters either on the 
entire leadership or on the "gang of four."54 Most important of all, the 
53. Tsai, loc. cit., p. 79; see also Liang Ming-chun, "Report from Peking: CCP CC 
Documents, nos. 4, 7 and 9," Contemporary, no. 8, April 15, 1981, p. 43. See Special 
Commentator, "An Important Reform on the Party and State Leadership System," 
Renmin Ribao, October 28, 1980. The economic reforms were played up during 
National People's Congress session in September 1980; see Beijing Review, September 
8, 15, 1980. 
54. Renmin Ribao, April 11, 1981. 
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article adopted an overall pro-Mao tone - it fervently defended the 
memory of the late Chairman and strongly reaffirmed his leadership 
and ideological authority. Placed in context, General Huang's 
pro-Mao tilt was out of step with such Dengists as Hu Yaobang who 
have campaigned since 1978 to repudiate the Maoist cult and 
critically assess Mao's legacy as a necessary step for freeing China 
from the shackles of Maoist influence, charting the nation's new 
course and for fashioning pragmatic political and economic reforms.55 
Thus the publication of Huang's article (which provided a limited 
rebuke of Mao) can be construed as a retreat by the Deng forces. Such 
a retreat, in retrospect, seems to be a necessary concession to pave 
the way to a new leadership consensus among China's disparate 
elites. As a matter of fact, Huang's article did set the tone for the 
party Resolution approved by the Sixth CC Plenum which passed 
judgment on Mao's place in the annals of China's Revolution. The 
Resolution, as pointed out before, leveled severe criticisms against 
the late Chairman, but to many Chinese and Dengists, the critique 
has not gone far enough. Not a few were particularly upset that the 
Resolution states that Mao's "contributions to the Chinese revolution 
far outweigh his mistakes" and that it upholds Mao Zedong thought 
as the Party's "founding principle." 
On the other hand, one can also argue that the compromise Deng 
and his allies made was shrewd politics, for their concession removed 
political deadlock that had blocked top leadership changes that they 
sought after. After considerable hard bargaining among the factions 
at a 10-day "preparatory meeting" prior to the plenary session, the 
Sixth CC Plenum which met for three days in the last week of June, 
approved Chairman Hua's demotion and Hu's elevation to Party 
Chairmanship. This was, without question, a major victory for Deng 
and Hu. However, it was only a limited victory, because they failed to 
effect other personnel and political changes and had to settle for 
much less than what they had wanted. For example, the plan to set 
up a Party central advisory committee and to transfer (or kick 
upstairs) Y e J ianying and other "old guards" to this largely honorific 
body has not materialized. Likewise, the Plenum has postponed 
55. Hu's inconoclastic assessment of Mao was reported in an interview in Tanjug 
<Belgrade), June 21, 1980; see also recent articles expounding views of the Deng camp: 
Special Commentator, "Rectifying the Guiding Thought on Economic Work - A 
Discourse on the Leftist Errors in Economic Construction," Renmin Ribao, April 9, 
1981; "Correctly Recognize the situation and policy, persist in Four Basic Principles," 
Hongqi, March 1, 1981. 
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decision, if not rejected altogether, a proposal to make Deng China's 
head of state and nominate him to serve as Chairman of the Republic 
(which would necessitate a revision of the present state Constitution). 
A number of major Dengist supporters, such as Wan Li, Yao Yilin 
and Xi Zhongxun, also failed to win expected promotion to the 
Politburo; although the Plenum elected Xi a Secretary of the CC 
Secretariat, it did not make him the General Secretary as the Deng 
camp had intended. There are other signs that the Plenum was only a 
temporary and uneasy truce among the rival political forces, and soon 
after the Party gathering they have renewed their conflict.;6 Hence 
further leadership and policy changes will occur at the 12th CCP 
Congress scheduled for next year, if not before. 
We should also take note of an ominous development - it is 
Deng, and not the new Party Chairman Hu Yaobang, who has taken 
over the Chairmanship of the Military Affairs Committee, a post used 
to be held concurrently by the Party Chairman (as was in the cases of 
Mao and Hua previously). Many PLA leaders are known to be 
strongly antagonistic toward Hu, and some have even questioned his 
credentials to be their commander. Thus the unusual arrangement 
can b_e seen at once as a conciliatory gesture to avoid further 
aggravating the relations between Hu and the PLA, and a forceful 
show of Deng's political support for his protege. 
How long will Deng, at age 77 now, be around to support and 
protect Hu, then? Can Chairman Hu survive politically after his 
56. Amid the reports circulating inside China on the resumed leadership clashes 
on August 18, 1981 editors of Renmin Ribao, the organ of the Party CC, published a 
self-criticism confessing errors for not criticizing Bai Hua and other writers in good 
time. Bai, a Party member who works in the Culture Department of Wuhan Military 
Region, is a playwright; his movie script, "Bitter Love," which depicts a painter who 
returned to China from America in the early 1950's to work for the motherland, but 
was persecuted to death during the GPCR, angered many cadres and touched ofT quite 
a controversy. On April 17, 1981, for instance, the army paper Jiefangjun Bao took the 
lead and published a stinging editorial, denouncing Bai, among other sins, for 
unglifying socialist motherhood, blackening the image of the Party and the country, 
and defaming people's army. On April 18, and 20, the army paper published more 
articles to attack Bai. On the other hand, many students in Peking and Shanghai rose 
to defend Bai and criticize the military authorities' attempt to clamp down on 
intellectuals. Reportedly, Hu Yaobang also defended Bai and urged a more tolerant 
attitude toward the writers and artists, lest the regime risked further alienating the 
intellectuals. To disassociate with the army's stance and to allay intellectuals' fear of a 
new crackdown, the party leadership (through the All-China Writers' Association) even 
cited a poem of Bai Hua in 1979 for an award. Against such a background, the 
self-criticism by Renmin Ribao would indicate that the party leadership has submitted 
to the military pressure and leadership conflict has intensified. 
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mentor is gone? How will he perform as Party Chairman? Can he in 
time develop his own political strength and convincingly demonstrate 
his stewardship, thereby proving to his allies and critics that he 
deserves to be China's supreme leader? These are crucial questions 
that will have bearing on Chinese politics. If Hu fails to perform, he, 
too, may suffer Hua Guofeng's fate. 
IX. The Reconstituted Leadership 
Since his political comeback in the summer of 1977, Deng has 
steadily restructured China's leadership. Several salient characteris-
tics of the reconstituted leadership are clearly discernible. 
First, the "old guards" predominate in the leadership bodies at 
all levels. These veteran officials were victims of the GPCR purges 
and have been rehabilitated only in recent years. Deng's restoration 
to power has seemingly legitimated their raison d'etre, and their 
political resuscitation symbolizes a stinging repudiation of Mao's 
rule. As a group, they are quite old, largely in the 70s and late 60s. In 
the Politburo, for example, the average age of the members is over 70 
(see Table 3). While the average age of the Secretariat members is 
slightly younger, it is still above the mid-60s. The picture is 
much the same for the leaders in the provincial party apparatus and 
in the PLA hierarchy. 57 
Ironically, the flood of rehabilitations has pushed out many 
younger cadres who were promoted during the GPCR. To be sure, 
there is a policy of persuading old cadres to step back into the 
so-called "second or third line," and of promoting middle-aged and 
young cadres to leadership responsibilities at all levels, and some 
beginnings have been made in this regard.58 However, progress is 
57. According to Chinese sources, the average age of PLA cadres at the army level 
is over 60, at the division level is over 55, at the regiment level is over 50, and at the 
battalion level is over 35. Moreover, the average age of leadership cadres in the 
Military Affairs Commission and the major military organs is between 65 and 75. See 
Wu Liping, "A Major Reform in the Cadre System," and Special Commentator, "Be a 
Promoter for Reform of the Cadre Structure," Hongqi, Nos. 10, and 11, 1980. 
58. See Hua Guofeng's speech to the September 1980 session of the National 
People's Congress, Beijing Review, Sept. 22, 1980, pp. 26-27. It is interesting to note 
that such senior military region commanders as Xu Shiyou (Canton>, Yang Dezhi 
(Kunming), Han Xianchu (Lanzhou), and Wang Pizheng (Wuhan> have been replaced 
by young PLA officers. Except for Qin Jiwei <Beijing), Yang Chengwu !Fuzhoul, and 
Wu Kenhua (Canton), who are in their late 60s, the other eight commanders (six of 
them appointed in 1980) are in their mid-60s or younger. In addition, these 11 military 
region commanders and many other newly appointed military district officials are 
Korean War veterans. 
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slow, for resistance among veteran cadres is quite strong. It is 
obvious that political stability and effectiveness of the Peking (or 
anyl regime depends ultimately on the promotion of young, worthy 
"revolutionary successors," hence the failure of the Chinese Commun-
ists to systematically infuse new blood into the top ruling bodies will 
have long-term adverse effects. 
Second, supporters (real or imagined) of the "gang of four" and Lin 
Biao - including those labeled the "wind faction," the "slippery 
faction," and the "quakers," as well as those diehard Maoists who 
opposed the current pragmatic policy line - have been ousted from 
the leadership bodies at all levels.59 Their removals solve some 
problems for Deng and his colleagues but create others. Among these 
newly purged officials are many relatively young cadres who were 
promoted during the GPCR decade, and their treatment runs counter 
to the policy of opening up leadership positions for the middle-aged 
and the young. Most serious of all, half of China's 38 million party 
members joined the Party after 1966, and a large number of them, 
strongly inbued with Maoist values, have been alienated by the 
wholesale dismissals of GPCR "upstarts," which they see as an 
assault on their belief system and a total negation of their political 
interests. 
Third, there is a trend toward specialization of functions and 
separation of party and government (or military) work. This is 
particularly discernible at the provincial level. Now the party first 
secretaries in all of China's 29 province-level administrative units no 
longer hold the top government posts concurrently (as was invariably 
the case during the GPCR and until 1978). In the same vein, with the 
exception of Tibet, no PLA officers are concurrently top provincial 
party or government leaders. At the height of the GPCR, in contrast, 
PLA officers headed 21 out of the 29 province-level administrative 
units and constituted the backbone elements in all of them. 
Fourth, in spite of the ascendancy of veteran officials and Deng's 
predominance, factionalism continues, and conflicting viewpoints on 
59. At the provincial level, quite a few officials who were guilty of graft, abuse of 
power, corruption, and other irregularities and misconduct have also been dismissed. 
Moreover, some officials who were in the "wrong" jobs and did not perform as expected 
have been moved to different localities or departments. An outstanding example is the 
transfer of Xi Zhongxun from the post of First Secretary of the Guangdong CCP 
Committee in November 1980. Lin Hujia, Party First Secretary and mayor of Peking 
was also replaced in early 1981, for he had conflicts with CCP General Secretary Hu 
Yaobang and transferred to Minister of Agriculture (for hints of the friction between 
Lin and Hu, see Renmin Ribao, Nov. 19, 19801. 
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major policy issues persist. This factionalism exists in the Party, the 
government, and the PLA hierarchy. In party policy councils, 
different approaches to economic construction are represented by 
Deng, Hu Yaobang, Chen Yun and Zhao Ziyang on the one hand, and 
by Hua, Li Xiannian, and the "petroleum" faction on the other. Even 
among the Dengists, differences also exist - with Chen stressing 
readjustment of policy priorities, while Hu and Zhao placing heavy 
emphasis on the reform of economic system and institutions. In the 
government, the "petroleum" faction is strongly entrenched, as its 
members control many of the economic and industrial ministries; 
they have resisted the changes in economic priorities (tilt toward 
agriculture and light industry) and economic cutback in recent years 
and are strongly against structural reform. Until the Sixth CC 
Plenum, China's elites have differed markedly on de-Maoization, on 
the reform program of Deng and on the future of Hua. A compromise 
was reached on some of these issues at the Plenum, but a deadlock on 
others has persisted. In the PLA, opposition to Hu Yaobang as new 
CCP Chairman is quite strong. Many PLA officers have blamed Hu's 
support of liberalization and campaign on de-Maoization for having 
generated the crises of belief, confidence and trust in China and 
continue to apply strong pressure to force him to crack down on the 
writers who ventured to criticize the regime. In addition, many 
former associates of Lin Biao, now out of political favor, are severely 
discontented. 
Last, but not the least, has been the highly publicized Deng-Hu 
policy of recruiting and promoting people of greater professional 
competence into leadership positions in order to implement the 
program of "four modernizations." Already such policy has been 
manifested in the new government appointments in which experts, 
scientists and cadres with strong professional background were 
promoted to provincial vice-governors, vice-mayors, department 
chiefs, and to vice-ministers and a few ministers at the central 
government level. What has been done is unquestionably a step in 
the right direction, but it is still too slow and too little. To modernize 
China, the Chinese leadership needs a vast number of experts and 
technocrats in major positions of responsibility in the government 
and in the party councils. As pointed out before, many veteran cadres 
who are more "red" than "expert" are reluctant to step down and 
have fought against the Deng-Hu efforts to make changes in 
personnel and policy. 
It is probably not unique in China that those who have already 
succeeded in ensconcing themselves in positions of power strive to 
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stay in power. However, certain historical, cultural and systemic 
factors may have rendered the elite circulation and upward political 
mobility even more diffirult in China. There is no question that the 
veteran cadres today played major leadership roles during the 
Communist movement and made the revolution, hence they claim 
they are entitled to positions of responsibility in the post-
revolutionary China. Top leadership posts also go to the veteran 
cadres because the Chinese Communists (with the exception of the 
radicals) still respect age and seniority, their criticism of Confucian 
ideas notwithstanding. It is well known in the PRC that those in the 
high positions enjoy many "perks," special privileges (e.g., education 
and job opportunities for children) and services (e.g., housing); 
naturally, they are reluctant to retire. 
All of these factors have, furthermore, been reinforced by 
Chinese Communists' creed and organizational principles. The Party 
is the self-appointed "vanguard of the proletariat," it monopolizes 
political power and outlaws political opposition and is not subject to 
the pressures for change that operate in democratic societies. By the 
system of democratic centralism, those at the top are "centralizers" 
and they perpetuate themselves at the summit of power. 
Like Mao, the "old guards" who are running China were master 
strategists and organizers of revolution. Whereas they excelled in the 
battlefield and were experts at creating organizations, conducting 
political campaigns, and manipulating human relations, their record 
and writings betray little genuine understanding of the requirements 
for China's industrialization and modernization. These revolutionary 
leaders were probably indispensable at the initial stages of post-
revolutionary consolidation of power, but they have been awfully 
inadequate and deficient in providing leadership for China's mod-
ernization drive since then. With industrialization and its concom-
itants of higher educational attainment and increasing differentia-
tion and specialization of function in the economy and the state 
administration, it would have been necessary to bring into the party 
leadership more and more of the new functional specialists. So far, 
this has not happened. In addition to the aforementioned reasons 
which hamper the upward political mobility .of the junior members in 
the elite circles, the emphasis on redness over expertise and the 
anti-intellectual biases of Mao and many of the Veterans have 
operated against the recruitment of elite from the society at large. 
The failure of the power elite to co-opt the talented members of the 
better educated and technical intelligentsia into its ranks is likely to 
retard China's modernization efforts. 
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X. Looking Ahead 
In some respects, the struggle for power in the Chinese political 
system in the post-Mao years has become less violent and more 
"routinized," now that the Chinese leaders try to establish and follow 
the "rules of the game." Hua's "resignation" provides a good 
illustration of this point, as well as an important precedent for the 
future. For the first time in more than three decades of Communist 
control, the Party Chairman has been toppled in accordance with 
some procedures, and his exit is accorded "courtesy," as Hua was 
allowed to "resign" and stay in the Politburo. In fact, already for a 
number of years now, it has been a fairly common practice not to 
totally disgrace the defeated political rivals - high officials ousted 
from positions of power have been allowed to keep the Politburo or 
Central Committee membership, or reassigned to less powerful or 
important posts. 
Whether or not they still wield any real power would probably 
vary from one case to another. The point here is that they, unlike 
those "capitalist roaders" during the GPCR and the "gang of four" 
since October 1976, are not in jail or under house arrest. The effect of 
this would tend to create a growing body of "counter-elite" who can 
wait in the wings and plot their political comeback. Take the case of 
Hua who, at 60, is among the youngest in the Politburo today and 
still vigorous. In the years to come, he would still be seen as a Maoist 
standard bearer, the logical leader of the Maoists and the benefi-
ciaries of the GPCR (most are "outs" or in eclipse) and, as such, will 
represent a political alternative to Hu Yaobang or whoever is in 
power. The existence of counterelite not only will place greater 
restraints on the incumbent but also will make it more difficult for 
him to consolidate his power. 
Futhermore, partly because the consequences of defeat in a 
power struggle will not be d~ath as was in Stalin's Russia, nor even a 
terrible sanction as was under Mao, personal and factional conflict 
in the post-Mao leadership has intensified. Factions and cliques 
existed in the CCP leadership in the course of the Communist 
movement. During the 1950s, the impact of personal historical 
associations and of factional conflict on policy was less salient, as the 
leadership was able to maintain a high degree of discipline and 
coherence. However, Mao's drive to recapture leadership control since 
the 1960s and his use of the tactics of "divide and rule, check and 
balance," while permitting him to maximize control, have fostered 
and intensified the factional cleavage. Such leadership division and 
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rivalry encouraged by Mao's manipulative approach appears to have 
outlived Mao and is likely to plague his successors for years to come. 
One major debilitating development in China's political system 
in the past decade has been the fragmentation of leadership power. 
The trend was already evident in the final years of Mao's life but has 
deteriorated further in recent years. It is quite obvious that today 
Deng, not to mention Hu, lacks the authority of Mao to generate 
personal power, or the power of Mao to create personal authority. 
Mao was both the ruler and the high priest !chief ideologist) of 
Communist China - performing several important leadership roles 
lpolicy initiation, policy legitimization, conflict resolution and politic-
al integration) and the paramount function of a "law giver." In 
contrast, neither Deng nor Hu is an established ideologist, and no one 
in China today can combine all of Mao's roles. Unquestionably, there 
is a discernible decline in power and leadership status of Mao's 
successors. However prominent Deng may appear since 1978, he has 
been only first among the equals and has had to share his leadership 
roles with, and in turn constrained by, such leaders as Ye Jianying, 
Chen Yun, Li Xiannian and, to a lesser extent, Peng Zhen and Hua 
Guofeng, at one time or another. Hu wields even less power under 
Deng's shadow and, making virtue out of necessity, has preached 
collective leadership on many occasions. The fact that Chairman Hu 
no longer holds the position of Chairman of MAC seems to attest to 
increasing differentiation of leadership roles and fragmentation of 
power among Chinese elites. 
Fragmentation of power can lead to many adverse consequences. 
It tends to breed leadership disunity and limits its capacity to map 
out and implement forcefully strong reform measures needed for 
many of China's deep-seated problems. The need to accommodate all 
factions and to compromise on divisive issues on personnel and policy 
has forced the Chinese leaders to "muddle through" without really 
taking unnecessary measures to solve problems. This in turn has 
adversely affected the ability of the regime to perform services and 
deliver goods to the society, thereby generating greater popular 
discontent. Chinese people are experiencing a severe crisis of belief, a 
crisis of confidence and a crisis of trust; these in turn contribute to a 
crisis of authority in Chinese leadership. The deepening of China's 
authority crisis has paradoxically compelled the regime to invoke the 
authority of Mao, even though that authority has already been 
tarnished and has been dysfunctional for a society striving for 
modernization. Moreover, the authority crisis diminishes the ability 
of the regime to elicit policy support and compliance through 
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persuasion, and may (and did) force the regime to turn to coercive 
means of control and pay special attention to the PLA to insure its 
loyalty to the party leadership. 
Many indicators of a praetorian regime are apparent in the 
Chinese political system today.60 One such indicator is the propensity 
for the military to intervene in political arena. In response to the 
GPCR, the PLA was deeply and extensively involved in Chinese 
politics. In October 1976, the PLA thrust itself into the political 
arena again as it took part in the coup that ousted the radicals and 
threw its support behind Hua making him Mao's successor. The 
propensity for the PLA leaders to get involved in leadership conflict 
resolution or to intervene in political affairs is also evident in the 
publication of Huang Kecheng's article and several other editorials 
and commentaries in the Liberation Army Daily in recent months 
which attacked the Party's liberalization policy. 
Although Deng has been remarkably successful in recent years 
in pushing the PLA "back to the barrack" and in keeping the PLA 
opposition in check, his success seems to be due more to personal 
factors (e.g., personal ties) and may thus be difficult to duplicate by 
others. Many precedents have been established for PLA intervention 
in a political struggle; moreover, the Chinese Communists have been 
unable or unwilling to maintain strict civil-military institutional 
boundaries. Thus, if the Chinese leadership fails to arrest and remove 
the trend toward praetorian politics, China's PLA leaders can be 
expected to intervene more forcefully in future leadership conflict. 
Like the 1976 coup, some of the PLA leaders could again play the role 
of "kingmakers," or some may even aspire to become kings them-
selves. 
60. Some of the indicators are: political participation is ''not moderated and 
channeled toward common goals by the reliable functioning of.political institutions;" 
political institutions art "weak, lacking in the moral authority to work out binding, 
allocative decisions that will be regarded as legitimate by the society as a whole;" and 
there is "a tendency for the military to intervene in the political arena." See Claude E. 
Welch, Jr. and Arthur K. Smith, Military Role and Rule (North Scituate, Mass.: 
Duxbury Press, 1974), p. 54. See also Samuel Huntingdon, Political Order in Changing 
Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 196-197, for a similar 
definition. 
THE NEW LEADERSHIP AFTER THE 
12TH PARTY CONGRESS 
When the Chinese Communists seized power in China in 1949, 
the new regime was then headed by a relatively young leadership 
nucleus which consisted of approximately 800 leaders. 1 Mao 
Zedong was then in his mid-fifties, Premier Zhou Enlai was just over 
fifty, and Deng Xiaoping was still in his mid-forties. The passage of 
time and constant political conflict over the past three decades have 
taken a heavy toll of this elite group, and only about half of these 
800 revolutionary leaders have survived. Nonetheless these veterans 
still retain firm control over China's ship of state today. 
Despite the vigorous campaign in recent years by Deng Xiaop-
ing and his followers to remove the "old guard" from the levers of 
power and promote younger cadres of greater professional compe-
tence into leadership positions, their efforts have only been partially 
successful. True, at the Party Congress in September 1982, 172 vet-
eran officials (both Deng's supporters and his opponents) had willy-
nilly stepped down from the Politburo, the Central Committee, and 
other front line positions of leadership and taken a back seat in the 
newly established Central Advisory Committee, which will have 
only advisory functions. However, numerous other leaders have 
stayed on in the Party's top policy-making councils, defying Deng's 
wish. 
For example, out of the 25 Politburo members, 18 are hold-
overs, and out of these 18, six are in their 80's and five more are in 
their late 70's. The seven newly elected members are not much 
younger, with six of them over 70 years old and one ,at 67 (see Table 
). All of the six members of the Politburo Standing Committee, the 
Party's topmost decision-making body, are also "re-elected," despite 
Deng's earlier maneuver to kick upstairs Marshall Ye Jianying (86) 
and Li Xiannian (78) who have opposed Deng's policies. 
On the other hand, Deng and his supporters did achieve much 
of what they wanted at the Party Congress. They succeeded in re-
moving from the Politburo ex-Party Chairman Hua Guofeng and 
several other leaders who were antagonistic to Deng's reforms. Al-
though unable to force the Party elders to retire from the Politburo, 
Deng elevated seven staunch supporters to the Politburo, thereby di-
I. Edgar Snow, The Other Side of the .River in .Red China Today, (New York: Ran-
dom House, 1961 ), p. 331. 
(37) 
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luting the strength of the opposition and ensuring the control of his 
backers and allies over this key policy-making body.2 
Furthermore, the Dengists have greatly strengthened their con-
trol over the central Secretariat, the strategic day-to-day decision-
making organ, as a result of the recent reshuffle. 3 The Secretariat is 
headed by Deng's confidant and protege, General Secretary Hu 
Yaobang, officially the Party's ranking leader. Although Hu re-
placed Hua as Party Chairman in June 1981, that post, which Mao 
created and assumed in 1945, was abolished at the 12th Party Con-
gress, thus symbolizing the close of Mao's era in the CCP history. 
Likewise, the Dengists now dominate the new Central Commit-
tee (CC), which consists of210 members and 138 alternates. Several 
salient characteristics of the new CC deserve attention. First, a total 
of210 members, 96 full and 114 alternate members, or slightly more 
than 60 percent of the 12th CC, are newly elected. The large number 
of the new recruits, especially among the alternate CC members, are 
relatively young and followers of Deng. Hu has also elevated many 
of his cohorts to the CC. Secondly, 75 (50 full and 25 alternate) 
members or about 21 percent of the CC are from the PLA; in com-
parison with the make-up of the 11th CC, military representation 
has declined. This seems to underscore Deng's apparent desire to 
curtail the influence of the army which has become a center for op-
position to his reforms in recent years. Thirdly, aside from the trans-
fer of 64 former CC members to the Central Advisory Council, an 
additional 53 members and 80 alternate members of the 11th CC 
have been dropped. 
In spite of the dominance of the Dengist forces in the new lead-
ership, opposition persists. It should be emphasized that at the pres-
ent stage there is no individual leader or political group on China's 
political horizon that could present a serious alternative to the pres-
ent leadership. So far, the opposition consists of diverse elements, 
2. The seven additions are Wan Li, Xi Zhongxun, Yang Shangkun, Yang Dezhi, 
Hu Qiaomu, Song Renquiong and Liao Chengzhi; those dropped from the Politburo are 
Hua Guofeng, Keng Biao, Peng Chong, Xu Shiyou, Chen Yonggui and Liu Bocheng 
who is over 85 and asked to be relieved. Furthermore, Yao Yilin who is one of the two 
vice-premiers in the State Council and heads the State Planning Commission and Qin 
Jiwei, Commander of the Peking Military Region, are elected alternate Politburo 
members. 
3. Six members of the Secretariat have been dropped-they are Xi Zhongxun, Yang 
Dezhi, Hu Qiaomu, and Fang Yi (all of them won seats at the Politburo); and Peng 
Chong and Wang Renzhong who have suffered political eclipse. Added to the Secret<ilry 
arc four secretaries, Yang Yung, Deng Liqun, Chen Pixian and Hu Qili, and two alter-
nate secretaries, Qiao Shi and Hao Jianxiu. 
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and they have not coalesced. They have criticized, blocked, delayed 
or otherwise constrained Deng's reform efforts, and for some years to 
come they may continue to do so. 
It is probably true that Chinese politics has become more insti-
tutionalized in recent years as a result of the emphasis placed by the 
current leadership on rules and regulations. Even so, the system is 
still greatly dependent for its orderly operation on a few top leaders; 
and as its linchpin, Deng is precariously holding the pieces together. 
An important question remains: after Deng dies, can Hu, Zhao 
Ziyang, Wan Li and other "second generation" leaders work to-
gether as a cohesive team? There are some signs from the reshuffled 
leadership personnel at the Party Congress that Hu has promoted his 
cohorts over other party officials and that Zhao's friends have not 
fared that well. Will there be a power rivalry between Hu and Zhao 
in the future? Furthermore, can the present leadership perform and 
deliver, now that people's expectations have been raised? 
Indeed, the Chinese people expect many improvements in their 
lot, but they will not wait forever. Before too long, Deng and his 
associates must be able to deliver enough goods and services to 
enough people. They have to speed up economic growth, create new 
jobs, reduce unemployment, and raise living standards of substantial 
segments of Chinese society. Currently, more than 20 million edu-
cated youth are unemployed or hold only menial jobs, and a double-
digit inflation in recent years has wiped out modest gains in urban 
and rural incomes. Indeed, the legitimacy and the staying power of 
the present leadership will hinge on its performance. 
Almost two years have elapsed since Hu assumed the top party 
post in June 1981. Thus far he has operated very much in the 
shadow of his mentor, and his own leadership qualities have re-
mained largely untested and unproven. As the ouster of ex-Party 
Chairman Hua has shown, the leader cannot be appointed from 
above, he has to prove his own leadership abilities and emerge from 
struggle. Although Hu enjoys Deng's confidence and support, much 
as Hua received Mao's imprimatur, Deng cannot be around forever 
to protect Hu. 
Thus it is highly pertinent whether or not Hu can in time 
demonstrate his own stewardship and convince the nation that he 
deserves to be the leader. The next few years will be crucial for Hu 
to show whether he can deliver. If he fails to perform, he too could 
suffer Hua's fate. 
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Table: China's Leadership Lineup 
I. CHINA'S AGING ELITE AT THE 6 PLENUM OF 11TH 
cc (1981) 
1. Politburo 
Chairman Hu Yaobang 66 
Vice-Chairman Ye Jianying 84 
Deng Xiaoping 77 
Zhao Ziyang 62 
Chen Yun 76 
Li Xiannian 76 
Hua Guofeng 60 
Members Keng Biao 72 
Wei Guoqing 75 
Yu Qiuli 67 
Peng Chong 66 
Fang Yi 65 
Ulanhu 78 
Xu Xiangqian 79 
Nie Rongzhen 82 
Liu Bocheng 84 
Deng Yingchao 78 
Wang Chen 73 
Peng Zhen 79 
Xu Shiyou 75 
Li Desheng mid-60s 
Zhang Tingfa mid-60s 
Ni Zhifu mid-50s 
Chen Y onggui 63 
Alternate members Chen Muhua late 50s 
Seypidin 65 
2. Secretariat 
General Secretary Hu Yaobang 66 
Secretaries Yu Qiuli 67 
Peng Chong 66 
Fang Yi 65 
Yang Dezhi 71 
Yao Yilin 64 
Wan Li 65 
GuMu 67 
Hu Qiaomu 69 
Song Renqiong 72 
Wang Renzhong 64 
Xi Zhongxun 68 
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3. State Council 
Premier 
Vice Premiers 
Zhao Ziyang 
Wan Li 
Keng Piao 
Yu Qiuli 
Fang Yi 
Chen Muhua 
Yao Yilin 
Ji Pengfei 
Zhang Aiping 
Bo Yibo 
Kang Shien 
KuMu 
Huang Hua 
Yang Qingjen 
62 
65 
72 
67 
65 
late 50s 
64 
71 
71 
74 
65 
67 
66 
76 
41 
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II. RESHUFFLED LEADERSHIP LINEUP AT 12TH PARTY 
CONGRESS 
(SEPTEMBER 1982) 
Age 
(as of 1983) Concurrent Post 
1. Politburo (25 members 
and 3 altnerate 
members) 
A. Politburo Standing 
Committee 
Members 
Hu Yaobang 68 
Ye Jianying 86 
Deng Xiaoping 79 Chairman, Central 
Advisory 
Commission, 
Military Affair 
Commission 
(MAC) 
Zhao Ziyang 64 Premier 
Li Xiannian 78 
Chen Yun 78 1st Secretary, 
Central 
Commission for 
Discipline 
Inspection 
B. Members (listed in 
the order of the 
number of strokes 
in their surnames) 
Wan Li 67 Vice-Premier 
Xi Zhongxun 70 Vice-chmn, National 
People's Congress 
(NPC) 
Wang Chen 75 President, Higher 
Party School 
Wei Guoqing 77 Vice-chmn, NPC 
Ulanhu 80 Vice-chmn, NPC 
Fang Yi 67 Counsellor of the 
State Council 
Deng Yingchao (f) 80 Vice-chmn, NPC 
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Age 
(as of 1983} Concurrent Post 
Li Desheng 67 Commander, 
Shenyang Military 
Region 
Yang Shangkun 76 Permanent Vice-
chmn, MAC 
Yang Dezhi 71 PLA Chief of 
Staff 
Yu Qiuli 69 PLA General 
Political 
Department 
Director 
Song Renqiong 74 
Zhang Tingfa 68 Air Force 
Commander 
Hu Qiaomu 71 
Nie Rongzhen 84 Vice-chmn, MAC 
Ni Zhifu 57 Director, All-
China Federation 
of Trade Unions 
Xu Xiangqian 81 Vice-chmn, MAC 
Peng Zhen 81 Acting Chairman, 
NPC 
Liao Chengzhi 77 Director, State 
Council Overseas 
Chinese Affairs 
c. Alernate members 
(listed in the order 
of the number of 
votes) 
Yao Yilin 66 Vice-Premier 
Qin Jiwei 71 Commander, Peking 
Military Region 
Chen Muhua (f) 62 Minister of External 
Economic & 
Trade Relations 
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Age 
(as of 1983} Concurrent Post 
2. Secretariat (10 members 
and 2 alternate 
members) 
A. General Secretary 
Hu Yaobang 68 
B. Members (listed in 
the order of the 
number of strokes 
in their surnames) 
Wan Li 65 
Xi Zhongxun 70 
Deng Liqun 68 Director, CCP 
Propaganda Dept. 
Yang Yong 71 (deceased in early 
1983) 
Yu Quill 69 
GuMu 69 Counsellor of State 
Council 
Chen Pixian 67 
Hu Qili 54 Director, CCP CC 
Staff Office 
Yao Yilin 66 
c. Alemate members 
(listed in the order 
of the number of 
votes) 
Qiao Shi 59 Director, CCP 
International 
Dept. 
Hao Jianxiu (f) 48 
3. Military Affairs 
Committee of the CCP 
Central Committee 
Chairman: Deng 79 
Xiaoping 
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Vice-Chmn: Ye 
Jianying 
Xu 
Xiangqian 
Nie Rongzhen 
Permanent 
Vice-Chmn Yang 
Shangkun 
(Zhang Aiping) 
Age 
(as of 1983) 
86 
81 
84 
76 
73 
Concurrent Post 
(Minister of 
Defense) 
45 
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